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HURRICANE KATRINA
Providing Oversight of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
Activities 
GAO’s past work has noted a host of needed improvements in a variety of 
government programs related to Hurricane Katrina and other natural 
disasters. For example, GAO found that there have been a number of 
challenges in preparing health care providers for catastrophic events. In 
addition, GAO’s work on energy issues has noted the interconnectedness of 
our petroleum markets and revealed the vulnerability of these markets to 
disruptions, natural or otherwise. GAO’s environmental work has indicated 
that the loss of wetlands has increased the severity of damage from 
hurricanes, and that cleanup of contaminated sites takes a tremendous 
amount of coordination and funding. Finally, GAO’s work on 
telecommunications issues has found that interoperable emergency 
communications are challenged by insufficient collaboration among federal, 
state, and local governments.  In these areas, among others, GAO has made a 
number of recommendations which are still open. 
 
While GAO has issued a number of relevant reports in the past, the 
accountability community has an active future agenda for evaluating the 
nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina.  The DHS Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) has developed a plan to coordinate Katrina-related oversight 
activities with the OIGs of 12 other departments and agencies, focusing on 
waste, fraud, and abuse. GAO plans to provide the Congress with more 
strategic evaluations to assess the federal, state, local, and private sector 
preparedness, response and recovery efforts related to Hurricane Katrina.  
GAO also plans to be involved in reviewing the overall accounting of and use 
of Katrina-related funds by federal agencies. 
 
 
Rescue Workers Search a Home in Flooded New Orleans 
 
 
Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 
Hurricane Katrina will have an 
enormous impact on people and 
the economy of the United States. 
The hurricane affected over a half 
million people located in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama and has 
resulted in one of the largest 
natural disaster relief and recovery 
operations in United States history. 
In terms of public health, standing 
water and high temperatures have 
created a breeding ground for 
disease, and public health 
advisories have warned about the 
spread of disease in the affected 
areas. Hurricane Katrina also 
resulted in environmental 
challenges, such as water and 
sediment contamination from toxic 
materials released into the 
floodwaters. In addition, our 
nation’s energy infrastructure was 
hard hit; it affected 21 refineries. In 
terms of telecommunications, 
Hurricane Katrina knocked out 
radio and television stations, more 
than 3 million customer phone 
lines, and more than a thousand 
cell phone sites. 
 
GAO prepared this testimony to 
highlight past work on government 
programs related to Hurricane 
Katrina and other natural disasters, 
and to provide information on 
plans and coordination among the 
accountability community—GAO, 
the Inspectors General, and other 
auditors at the state and local level. 
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 
I am pleased to be here today to discuss oversight of the nation’s response 
to Hurricane Katrina. As Comptroller General Walker has stated, while the 
Inspectors General of the various departments plan to conduct detailed 
work on fraud, waste, and abuse in individual programs in federal 
agencies, GAO plans to provide support to Congress through analysis and 
evaluation of the various issues related to coordination among different 
federal agencies, and between these federal agencies and the state, local, 
and private sectors. The Comptroller General has also stated that GAO will 
be involved in reviewing the overall funding for and use of Katrina-related 
funding by various federal agencies. In addition, GAO has conducted 
several related reviews in the past—including reviews of federal actions 
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992—that will be helpful in evaluating the 
nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Before I begin my detailed comments, I want to say that, as you know, all 
of us at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, as all Americans, were 
saddened by the destruction that Hurricane Katrina caused throughout the 
Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, and 
the ensuing days. One of the many roles of government is to provide for its 
citizens at a time when they are most in need. Because of Hurricane 
Katrina, it is clear that strengthening the nation’s emergency response 
efforts is at the top of the national agenda. While this testimony is a 
dispassionate and analytical discussion of some of the challenges faced by 
the nation, we recognize the terrible costs of Hurricane Katrina in human 
terms and our hearts go out to the victims and their families. 
Hurricane Katrina will have an enormous impact on people and the 
economy of the Gulf Coast as well as the United States. The hurricane 
affected over a half million people located within approximately 90,000 
square miles spanning Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and has 
resulted in one of the largest natural disaster relief and recovery 
operations in United States history. Many of the sectors affected by the 
hurricane are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. In terms of public health, standing water and high 
temperatures have created a breeding ground for disease, and public 
health advisories have warned about the spread of disease in the affected 
areas. The medical needs of evacuees will be an additional challenge; 
many evacuees are without medical records and at risk of losing their 
medical coverage. Hurricane Katrina also resulted in environmental 
challenges, such as water and sediment contamination from toxic 
materials released into the floodwaters. In addition, our nation’s energy 
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infrastructure was hard hit. The Department of Energy reported that  
21 refineries in affected states were either shut down or operating at 
reduced capacity in the aftermath of the hurricane. Damaged transmission 
lines left as many as 2.3 million customers without electricity. The 
hurricane also disrupted commerce. According to the Department of 
Commerce, the ports damaged by Hurricane Katrina accounted for  
4.5 percent of total exports of goods from the United States last year, and 
5.4 percent of total U.S. imports. Finally, in terms of telecommunications, 
the Federal Communications Commission reported that Hurricane Katrina 
knocked out radio and television stations, more than 3 million customer 
phone lines, and more than a thousand cell phone sites. 
In my statement today I will highlight some of GAO’s previous work on 
challenges faced by government preparedness, response, and recovery 
programs, many of which are directly related to this committee’s 
jurisdiction. For future work, GAO will continue to provide this committee 
and Congress with independent analysis and evaluations, and coordinate 
our efforts with the accountability community to ensure appropriate 
oversight of federal programs and spending. As provided for in our 
congressional protocols, we plan to conduct Katrina-related work under 
the Comptroller General’s statutory authority since it is an issue of interest 
to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both houses. 
My statement is based upon our extensive work spanning a wide variety of 
topics over a number of years. Much of this work was done relatively 
recently in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 
March 2003. In all, we have published over 120 reports on disaster 
preparedness and response, and other issues raised by Katrina, which are 
useful in moving forward in addressing problems encountered with the 
nation’s response to the hurricane. At the end of this statement is a 
comprehensive list of our related products. 
 
Our past work has noted needed improvements in government programs 
related to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. Many of these challenges relate to 
programs under the jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee. 
For example, health care providers have not always been adequately 
prepared for catastrophic events. The health care community has been 
addressing some of these challenges, such as those involving coordination 
efforts and communications systems, more readily than others, such as 
infrastructure and workforce issues, which are more resource-intensive. 
Summary 
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Our work on energy issues has described some of the consequences of 
hurricanes on petroleum markets—such as rapid gasoline price increases. 
Our environmental work has indicated that the loss of wetlands has 
increased the severity of damage from hurricanes, and that cleanup of 
contaminated sites takes a tremendous amount of coordination and 
funding. Finally, our work on telecommunications issues has found that 
first responders are challenged by a lack of interoperable emergency 
communications. In these areas, among others, we have made a number of 
recommendations, many of which are still pending completion. 
 
There are a host of challenges to government programs related to 
Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters in terms of preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Our work on preparedness—programs to prevent 
disasters or prepare to respond in advance—has identified needed 
improvements in a number of areas, including balancing efforts to prepare 
for terrorism with efforts related to natural disasters and all hazards; 
planning preparedness efforts and setting goals and measures; providing 
training, exercises, evaluations, and lessons learned to first responders; 
providing flood control and protection; improving public health 
preparedness; and providing federal grants to state and local governments. 
Similarly, our work on response to disasters has identified a number of 
problems. These relate to federal, state and local roles in coordinating the 
response; the role of the military, to include the National Guard; and the 
medical and public health response capabilities. Furthermore, our work on 
recovery—programs to help communities and victims get back to 
normal—has also identified challenges related to federal assistance to 
recovery areas, private nongovernment assistance efforts, and lessons 
from overseas recovery programs. In many of these areas we have made a 
number of recommendations, some of which have still not been 
implemented. Below are some examples of our previous and planned work 
related to the jurisdiction of this committee regarding preparedness, 
response, and recovery issues related to health care, energy, the 
environment, and telecommunications. 
 
Hurricane Katrina raised a number of health care concerns, and the 
preparedness of health care providers, their response capabilities, and 
health care agency and hospital capacity are all important in a major 
disaster. The National Strategy for Homeland Security had a specific 
Past GAO Work Has 
Highlighted Needed 
Improvements in 
Many Programs 
Related to 
Preparedness, 
Response, and 
Recovery 
Health Care Issues 
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initiative to prepare health care providers for catastrophic events, such as 
major terrorist attacks.1 However, in April 2003, we reported that many 
local areas and their supporting agencies may not have been adequately 
prepared to respond to such an event.2 Specifically, while many state and 
local officials reported varying levels of preparedness to respond to a 
bioterrorist attack, they reported that challenges existed because of 
deficiencies in capacity, communication, and coordination elements 
essential to preparedness and response. These included workforce 
shortages, inadequacies in disease surveillance and laboratory systems, 
and a lack of regional coordination and compatible communications 
systems. Some of these challenges, such as those involving coordination 
efforts and communications systems, were being addressed more readily, 
whereas others, such as infrastructure and workforce issues, were more 
resource-intensive. Generally, we found that cities with more experience 
in dealing with public health emergencies were generally better prepared 
for a major disaster (such as a bioterrorist attack) than other cities, 
although challenges remain in every city. Almost a year later, in February 
2004, we reported that although states had further developed many 
important aspects of public health preparedness, no state was fully 
prepared to respond to a major public health threat.3 Specifically, states 
had improved their disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, 
communications capacity, and workforce needed to respond to public 
health threats, but gaps in each remained. Moreover, regional planning 
among states was lacking, and many states lacked surge capacity—the 
capacity to evaluate, diagnose, and treat the large numbers of patients that 
would present during a public health emergency. 
In terms of health care agencies and hospital capacities, we also found 
major deficiencies. In May 2003 we testified that while the efforts of public 
health agencies and health care organizations to increase their 
preparedness for major public health threats have increased, significant 
challenges remained.4 Specifically, we found most emergency departments 
                                                                                                                                    
1See the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the White House, July 2002. 
2See GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied Across State and Local Jurisdictions, 
GAO-03-373 (Washingon, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003). 
3See GAO, Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving, but Much 
Remains to Be Accomplished, GAO-04-458T, (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004). 
4See GAO, SARS Outbreak: Improvements to Public Health Capacity Are Needed for 
Responding to Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases, GAO-03-769T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2003). 
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across the country lacked the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious 
disease outbreaks. For example, although most hospitals across the 
country reported participating in basic planning activities for large-scale 
infectious disease outbreaks, few had acquired the medical equipment 
resources—such as ventilators—that would be required in such an event. 
Further, because most emergency departments already routinely 
experienced some degree of overcrowding, they may not be able to handle 
the sudden influx of patients that would occur during a large-scale 
infectious disease outbreak. Regarding hospital capacity, in August 2003 
we reported that the medical equipment available for response to certain 
incidents (e.g., as a biological terrorist incident) varied greatly among 
hospitals.5 Additionally, many hospitals reported that they did not have the 
capacity to respond to the large increase in the number of patients that 
would be likely to result from incidents with mass casualties. 
In our April 2003 report on preparedness, we made a number of 
recommendations to help state and local jurisdictions better prepare for a 
bioterrorist attack and to develop a mechanism for sharing solutions 
between jurisdictions.  In response to this report, the Departments of 
Health and Human Services and Homeland Security concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations. 
• We plan future work related to Hurricane Katrina regarding public 
health and health services, including mental health services issues. 
Specifically, we plan to conduct evaluations of evacuation plans for 
inpatient and long-term care health facilities; federal, state, and local 
preparedness plans for dealing with the health consequences of natural 
and man-made disasters; and provision of mental health services for 
evacuees and first responders. 
 
The wide-ranging effects of Hurricane Katrina on gasoline prices 
nationwide are a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of our 
petroleum markets and reveal the vulnerability of these markets to 
disruptions, natural or otherwise.6 These markets have become stressed 
over time, in part because of a proliferation of special gasoline blends that 
have raised costs and affected operations at refineries, pipelines, and 
                                                                                                                                    
5See GAO, Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack 
Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response, GAO-03-924 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 
2003). 
6For a primer on gasoline prices, see GAO, Motor Fuels: Understanding the Factors That 
Influence the Retail Price of Gasoline, GAO-05-525SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005). 
Energy Issues 
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storage terminals.7 As we noted in our recent testimony on energy 
markets, Hurricane Katrina did tremendous damage to, among other 
things, electricity transmission lines, and oil producing, refining, and 
pipeline facilities.8 Because the Gulf Coast refining region is a net exporter 
of petroleum products to all other regions of the country, retail gasoline 
prices in many parts of the nation rose dramatically. A variety of factors 
determine how gasoline prices vary across different locations and over 
time. For example, gasoline prices may be affected by unexpected refinery 
outages or accidents that significantly disrupt the delivery of gasoline 
supply. Future gasoline prices will reflect the world supply and demand 
balance and will continue to be an important factor affecting the American 
consumer for the foreseeable future. The impact of gasoline prices is felt 
in virtually every sector of the U.S. economy. Some of our more significant 
open recommendations are that (1) the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), with the Department of Energy (DOE) and others, develop a plan 
to balance the environmental benefits of using special fuels with the 
impacts these fuels have on the gasoline supply infrastructure, and (2) if 
warranted, EPA work with other agencies to identify what statutory or 
other changes are required to implement this plan. EPA declined to 
comment on our recommendations and did not signify agreement or 
disagreement with them. 
• We plan future work on energy issues in order to better understand the 
vulnerability of the nation’s energy infrastructure to natural or 
manmade disasters. Specifically, we plan to conduct evaluations of 
determinants of gasoline prices in particular, and the petroleum 
industry more generally. Included will be evaluations of world oil 
reserves; security of maritime facilities for handling and transporting 
petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products; viability of the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve to respond to disruptions such as 
Hurricane Katrina; and impacts of the potential disruption of 
Venezuelan oil imports. 
 
Hurricane Katrina resulted in significant impacts on Gulf Coast 
environmental resources. The condition of environmental resources has 
an important role in both the prevention and of recovery from natural 
                                                                                                                                    
7See GAO, Gasoline Markets: Special Gasoline Blends Reduce Emissions and Improve 
Air Quality, but Complicate Supply and Contribute to Higher Prices, GAO-05-421 
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005). 
8See GAO, Energy Markets: Gasoline Price Trends, GAO-05-1047T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
21, 2005). 
Environmental Issues 
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disasters. In the area of prevention, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has 
responsibility for constructing hurricane prevention and flood control 
projects throughout the country. The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 
Hurricane Protection Project was one such project that was authorized by 
Congress in 1965 to provide hurricane protection to New Orleans from a 
fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.9 Similarly, wetlands, once regarded as 
unimportant areas to be filled or drained for agricultural or development 
activities, are now recognized for the variety of important functions that 
they perform, including providing flood control by slowing down and 
absorbing excess water during storms; maintaining water quality by 
filtering out pollutants before they enter streams, lakes, and oceans; and 
protecting coastal and upland areas from erosion.10 Moreover, it has been 
suggested that wetlands act as a speed bump, slowing down storms almost 
as dry land does. The Fish and Wildlife Service reports that more than half 
of the 221 million acres of wetlands that existed during colonial times in 
what is now the contiguous United States have been lost. There is no 
reliable set of wetland acreage estimates to be used to evaluate the 
progress made in achieving the goal of “no net loss” of the remaining 
wetlands. In the area of recovery, Hurricane Katrina poses an enormous 
challenge in terms of the cleanup of hazardous materials in the area. 
Industrial discharges, sewage, gas and oil from gas stations, household 
hazardous materials, pesticides, and chemicals contaminated the 
floodwaters. The long-term effects of these hazardous materials, the level 
of effort and coordination needed and the cost of decontamination and 
cleanup will take some time to determine. 
In situations where such contamination exits, EPA serves as the lead 
agency for the cleanup of hazardous materials, including oil and gasoline.  
EPA emergency response personnel are working in partnership with 
FEMA and state and local agencies to help assess the damage, test health 
and environmental conditions, and coordinate cleanup from Hurricane 
Katrina. They are conducting water, air, and sediment testing, assessing 
drinking water and wastewater facilities, examining superfund and other 
hazardous waste sites affected by the storms, issuing environmental 
waivers, and providing public advisories regarding drinking water and the 
potential for hazardous debris in homes and buildings. 
                                                                                                                                    
9 See GAO, Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 
Protection Project, GAO-05-1050T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005). 
10 See GAO, Wetlands Overview: Problems With Acreage Data Persist,  
GAO/RCED-98-150, (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 1998). 
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• We plan future work on environmental issues, such as evaluations of 
how EPA and other federal, state, and local agencies conduct water, 
soil, and air quality testing to determine when it will be safe for 
residents to return to New Orleans. We also plan to evaluate efforts to 
treat hazardous materials during the cleanup efforts and restore 
drinking water and wastewater facilities. We also plan to review the 
Army Corps of Engineers efforts to repair the integrity of the hurricane 
protection structures in the New Orleans area and assess issues 
relating to wetland losses. 
 
Hurricane Katrina knocked out a wide variety of communications 
infrastructure and communication among emergency personnel is 
important in any disaster. The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
called for seamless communications among all first responders and public 
health entities. However, in our August and November 2003 reports, we 
noted that insufficient collaboration among federal, state, and local 
governments had created a challenge for sharing public health information 
and developing interoperable communications for first responders.11 For 
example, states and cities had implemented many initiatives to improve 
information sharing, but these initiatives had not been well coordinated 
and risked creating partnerships that limited access to information and 
created duplicative efforts. Another challenge involved the lack of 
effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning 
for interoperable communications. For instance, the federal and state 
governments lacked a coordinated grant review process to ensure that 
funds were used for communications projects that complemented one 
another and added to overall statewide and national interoperability 
capacity.12 Moreover, we testified in April 2004 that the Wireless Public 
Safety Interoperable Communications Program, or SAFECOM, had made 
very limited progress in achieving communications interoperability among 
all entities at all levels of government and had not achieved the level of 
collaboration necessary.13 Finally, in our October 2003 report on public 
                                                                                                                                    
11See GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 
Strengthened, GAO-03-760, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2003); and Homeland Security: 
Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for First Responders,  
GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003). 
12See GAO, Homeland Security Federal leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications, GAO-04-740 
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004). 
13See GAO, Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort 
Requires Stronger Collaboration, GAO-04-494 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.16, 2004). 
Telecommunications 
Issues 
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health preparedness, we reported that challenges existed in ensuring 
communication among responders and with the public.14 For example, 
during the anthrax incidents of 2001, local officials identified 
communication among responders and with the public as a challenge, both 
in terms of having the necessary communication channels and in terms of 
making the necessary information available for distribution. 
We made a number of recommendations that DHS, in conjunction with 
other federal agencies, complete a database on communication 
frequencies, determine the status of wireless public safety 
communications nationwide, tie grant funding to statewide 
interoperability plans, and review the interoperability functions of 
SAFECOM. DHS has agreed to take some, but not all, of the corrective 
actions we recommended. 
 
We have issued a number of reports relevant to evaluating Hurricane 
Katrina. In addition, the accountability community—including the IGs and 
GAO—has an active future agenda for evaluating the nation’s response to 
the hurricane. Congress has recently passed legislation that provided $15 
million for the DHS IG to audit and investigate Hurricane Katrina response 
and recovery activities.15 The DHS IG has developed a plan for oversight of 
the funds being spent directly by DHS components and the IGs of the 12 
other departments and agencies that account for almost all of the 
remainder of the funds appropriated thus far. The primary objective of the 
IG plan is to ensure accountability, primarily through ongoing audit and 
investigative efforts designed to identify and address waste, fraud, and 
abuse. Each IG will be issuing an individual report to ensure that the 
affected people, organizations, and governments receive the full benefit of 
the funds being spent and to be spent on disaster response and recovery 
programs. The DHS IG will coordinate the work of the respective IGs 
through regular meetings, and the overall account of funds will be 
coordinated with us through regular meetings with our senior officials. 
As the IGs focus on fraud, waste, and abuse, GAO can provide Congress 
with more strategic evaluations on such issues as coordination among 
                                                                                                                                    
14See GAO, Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001,  
GAO-04-152 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2003). 
15 Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising 
from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. 109-62, 119 Stat. 190, 191 (2005). 
Concluding 
Observations 
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various agencies and state and local government and the private sector. 
Some of our past strategic work included reports in the wake of Hurricane 
Andrew in 199216 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.17 Other 
strategic-level reports have covered such topics as barriers to interagency 
coordination,18 issues related to continuity of operations planning for 
essential government services,19 and DHS’ efforts to enhance first 
responders’ all-hazards capabilities.20 Many of our past reports, which 
provide a firm foundation for doing Katrina-related work, contain 
recommendations to improve top-level coordination. While several 
changes have occurred in terms of the government’s structure and process 
for emergency preparedness and response, the extent to which many of 
our earlier recommendations have been fully implemented remains 
unclear. 
In closing, we will continue to work with the accountability community 
and have already reached out to the relevant congressional committees, 
federal IGs, and state and local auditors in the affected states to 
coordinate our efforts, avoid unnecessary duplication, and most 
effectively utilize our resources. Comptroller General Walker has been 
personally and extensively involved in this effort and he plans to continue 
to be heavily involved. 
-     -     -     -     - 
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 
to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have 
at this time. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
16See GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic 
Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993). 
17See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, 
GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 
18See GAO, Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, 
 GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000). 
19See GAO, Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery of 
Essential Government Services, GAO-04-160 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2004). 
20See GAO, Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazards 
Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005). 
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Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further 
information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin at 
(202) 512-8777 or at rabkinn@gao.gov, or William O. Jenkins, Jr., at  
(202) 512-8757 or at jenkinswo@gao.gov. This statement was prepared 
under the direction of Stephen L. Caldwell. Key contributors were 
Nancy Briggs, Christine Davis, David Lysy, Stephanie Sand, and 
Ashanta Williams. 
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